

CHAPTER 6

GRONDONA'S TYPOLOGY

A Cultural Typology of Economic Development

Argentinean sociologist and historian Mariano Grondona has developed a cultural typology to analyse what he painfully calls his country's "disappointing history." He presents his Cultural Typology of Economic Development as a clarification of his conclusion: "The paradox of economic development is that economic values are not enough to ensure it.... The values accepted or neglected by a nation fall within the cultural field. We may thus say that economic development is a cultural process."¹

Grondona is mindful that his conclusions are controversial in the midst of the cultural relativism prevalent in the thinking of so many—the view that all cultures are essentially equal and all comparative value judgments are equally invalid. But as he points out, the fact remains that some cultures show themselves to be *resiliently progress-prone*

while others are *persistently progress-resistant*.²

Harvard University's Lawrence E. Harrison says, "I believe that cultures that nurture human creative capacity and progress are better than those that don't. Some may be offended by this assertion, but it is, I believe, corroborated by the persistent flow of immigrants from cultures that suppress progress to those cultures that facilitate it."³ In other words, more people want to immigrate to Canada than to Cameroon, to Boston than to Bhopal.

Although Roman Catholic Argentina is Grondona's example of development resistance, his implication includes all Iberian/Catholic-based cultures that share the same operative characteristics, whether México or Macao, Spain or El Salvador, Portugal or Peru, Belgium or Brazil.⁴ And he is not alone. Carlos Montaner, Mala Htun, Elizabeth Brusco, and Octavio Paz have made similar arguments, documenting the same kinds of phenomena.⁵ Conversely, French Minister of Finance, Alain Peyrefitte, and Max Weber, one of the founders of sociology, among others, connect Protestant culture with progress/development-prone countries: Switzerland, Sweden, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, West Germany, Australia, Finland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, not to mention British-influenced Hong Kong and Singapore.⁶

Take for instance, just one factor: the cultural value of social distance. Social distance is a priority value in the cultures

of Southern Europe, Africa, and South Asia. Daniel Etounga-Manguelle⁷, building on the global surveys of D. Bollinger and G. Hofstede,⁸ comments on the cultural value of hierarchical distance, the degree of social verticality in a nation's worldview.

Hierarchical distance, Etounga-Manguelle explains, is "generally substantial in tropical and Mediterranean climates.... In countries with substantial hierarchical distances, the society tends to be static and politically centralized. What little national wealth exists is concentrated in the hands of an elite. The generations pass without significant change in mind-set." Examples are the Latin sisters of Southern Europe: Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, and the nations of West, Central, and South Africa, including the Caribbean countries of the West African hegemony.⁹

By contrast, different cultural values, making almost all the difference, create a different kind of social order.¹⁰ In fact, "it is the reverse in countries with short hierarchical distances. Technological changes happen because the group needs technical progress; the political system is decentralized and based on a representative system; the national wealth, which is substantial, is widely distributed; and children learn things that their parents never knew."¹¹

Grondona, then, is very close to the position maintained by Landes and Haq, working from the research approach

of the 'human development paradigm'. SDavid Landes, economic historian at Harvard, argues: "Culture makes almost all the difference." Pakistani economist Mahub ul Haq concludes that the human development paradigm of research "embraces all of society—not just the economy. The political, cultural and social factors are given as much attention as the economic factors." "In fact," he emphasises, "study of the link between the economic and the non-economic environment is one of the most fascinating and rewarding aspects of this new analysis."¹² Landes' research also readily acknowledges the interface of many factors, all making varying contributions and differences. But the fact continually surfaces that, in the midst of the political, economic, social, and cultural dynamics, "culture makes almost all the difference." That is the argument I advance here.¹³

Grondona uses twenty factors in his Cultural Typology of Economic Development. Here, I draw on only eight of Grondona's comparisons, supplemented from a similar discussion by Lawrence Harrison. For, as Grondona indicates, the list is "not definitive. It could be amplified by additional contrasts or it could be reduced, seeking only the most important differences."

"Practicality" is his criterion, and he sees the twenty factors as "sufficient to obtain some idea of the contrasting visions" from which the two value systems of progress-engendering and progress-hindering flow.¹⁴

Grondona's Typology

QUALITY	PROGRESS-PRONE CULTURE	PROGRESS-RESISTANT CULTURE
1 Time focus	Present and Future Oriented <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • activist arrow-time • create the future 	Past or Present Oriented <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fatalistic cycle-time • receive the future
2 Work	Ascetic: Central to Good life <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • satisfying & self-respect noble & indispensable • savings invested for subsequent consumption 	Festive: Necessary Evil <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • real satisfaction & pleasure is outside workplace • savings redistributed thru ceremonial consumptions
3 Merit	Achievement-Oriented <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • merit rewarded • conduct counts 	Ascription-Oriented <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • relationships rewarded • connections count
4 Education	Socially Central <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • literacy for all • endeavour of all 	Socially Peripheral <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • literacy for some • entitlement by elites
5 Women	Gender Equality <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • formal status of parity • relationships of respect 	Gender Inequality <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • formal status of disadvantage • relationships of non-respect
6 Sense of community	Universalistic <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • wider society beyond family trusting of others • public concerns 	Particularistic <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • individualistic & familistic nontrusting of others • non-public concerns
7 Ethics	Rigorous Code <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • uniform application of principles to all 	Flexible Code <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • preferential application to persons known
8 Worldview and Civic Pluralism	Public Worldview Religious Pluralism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conversion in and out • low social violence between groups 	Public Worldview Religious Monopoly <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conversion in, not out • high social violence between groups

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¹ M. Grondona, "A Cultural Typology of Economic Development" 46, in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*. New York: Basic Books 2000.

² M. Grondona, *The Triangle of Development*. Unpublished manuscript. See also Robert Edgerton, *Sick Societies*. New York: Free Press; Darrell Delamaide, "Roman Teaching and Latin Enterprise" 80-83, "From Lisbon to Venice" 88-90, and "*Mare Nostrum: The Mediterranean Rim*" 90-95, in *The New Superregions of Europe*. New York: Plume Penguin Books 1994; and G. Hofstede, *Exploring Culture*. Bangalore: Intercultural Press 2002.

³ *Who Prospers: How Cultural Values Shape Economic and Political Success*. Basic Books 1992, 16. See also Robert Edgerton's discussion of worldview formulations that cause "dysphoria" and socially reinforced traditions and behaviours that are "maladaptive", and the argument that "some beliefs and behaviours serve human needs and social requisites better than others," in *Sick Societies: Challenging the Myth of Primitive Harmony*. New York: The Free Press 1992, 144, 65-74, 101-104, and 202-209.

For an example of universally commended behaviour and a compelling record of extraordinary moral rightness, consult all of Emmy E. Werner, *A Conspiracy of Decency: The Rescue of the Danish Jews During World War II*. Cambridge: Westview Press 2002, with special attention to the moral and spiritual fountains that fed such acts, 167-

181.

⁴ Grondona 2000, 2-13.

⁵ For an accessible introduction to the arguments and literature see Carlos Rangel, *The Latin Americans: Their Love-Hate Relationship with the United States*. Trenton: Rutgers The State University and Transaction Publishers 1987; Carlos Alberto Montaner, "Culture and the Behaviour of Elites in Latin America" 56-64; Mala Htun, "Culture, Institutions, and Gender Inequality in Latin America" 189-199; and Michael Fairbanks, "Changing the Mind of a Nation: Elements in a Process for Creating Prosperity" 268-281, in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*. New York: Basic Books 2000; as well as David Stoll, *Is Latin America Turning Protestant?: The Politics of Evangelical Growth*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1990; Elizabeth E. Brusco, *The Reformation of Machismo: Evangelical Conversion and Gender in Colombia*. Austin: University of Texas Press 1995; and David Martin, "Evangelical Expansion and 'Progressive Values' in the Developing World" 117-136, in Lawrence E. Harrison and Jerome Kagan (eds.), *Developing Cultures: Essays on Cultural Change*. New York: Routledge 2006.

⁶ Alain Peyrefitte, *The Trouble with France*. New York: New York University Press 1985; Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. New York: Scribner 1950; and Peter Berger and Samuel P. Huntington, *Many*

Globalizations. New York: Oxford University Press 2002; and T. Wolf, "The Empty Chair: Democracy in the Middle East." New Delhi: University Institute 2004.

⁷ Etounga-Manguelle, a Cameroonian, is president of the Société Africaine d'Etude, d'Exploitation et de Gestion (SADEG). SADEG is currently involved in more than fifty development projects in Africa, and he is a former member of the World Bank's Council of African Advisors.

⁸ Citing D. Bollinger and G. Hofstede, *Les différences culturelles dans le management*. Paris: Les Editions Organisation 1987; and Alassane Ndaw, *La Pensée Africaine—Research on the Foundations of Negro-African Thought*. Paris: Nouvelles Editions Africaines 1983. See also Ronald Inglehart, *Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990; Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65 (February), 19-51; Stephen J. Kobrin, "Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World Economy" *Journal of International Affairs* 51 1998, 361-86; and G. Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviours, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations*. Beverly Hills: Sage 2001.

⁹ For the Southern Europe Sisters, see the historical and cultural contrasts of Northern and Southern Italy, cf.

Edward Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. Chicago: Gateway 1958; Robert Diego Gambetta, *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1993; and D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.

¹⁰ See David Martin on different spiritual values creating an alternative social experience in South India in *Forbidden Revolutions: Pentecostalism in Latin America, Catholicism in Eastern Europe*. Minneapolis: Fortress 1996, 37-39; George Weigel, *The Final Revolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992; Ruth Marshall, "Power in the Name of Jesus" *Review of African Political Economy* 52 1991:21-37; Elizabeth Brusco, *The Reformation of Machismo*. Austin: University of Texas Press 1995. Paul Freston, "The Protestant Eruption into Modern Brazilian Politics" *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 11.2 1996:147-68.

¹¹ See "Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?" 56-77 in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*. New York: Basic Books 2000. This citation is from Etounga-Manguelle 2000, 68.

Some nations are an odd fit: France, Italy, and Japan. But even in this odd-nations category, again, cultural makes almost all the difference. For example, France, Italy (particularly in the south), and Japan are also countries of high hierarchical distance, but manifest blended

characteristics of progress-prone cultures. Many argue that it is by particular cultural values, chosen at particular points in their history, that these odd-category nations gain a fit with the progress-prone short hierarchical distant cultures.

On France's indecision to go with Northern Europe or remain attached to Southern Europe culture, see Peyrefitte 1985; and on Japan's 19th century Meiji Restoration and Japan as an Asian version of Weber's Protestant ethic thesis, see Landes 2000, 2-3, 7-10; and Loren Cunningham, *The Book that Transforms Nations*. Honolulu: YWAM Publishing 2007, 139-149.

¹² Mahbub ul Haq, "The Human Development Paradigm" 19, 17-34, in Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and A. K. Shiva Kumar (eds.), *Readings in Human Development: Concepts, Measures and Policies for a Development Paradigm*. Foreword by Amartya Sen. United Nations Development Programme. New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2003.

¹³ See also Thom Wolf, "The 1,000-Year Phenomenon: A Note on Different Spiritualities" *Oikos Worldview Bulletin* Volume 6 Issue Spring 2006; and Thom Wolf, "Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies" *Journal of Applied Christian Leadership* Vol. 1 No. 1 Spring 2006, 55-70.

¹⁴ Grondona 2000, 53; and Lawrence E. Harrison, *The Pan American Dream*. New York: Basic Books 1997.

¹⁵ See Lawrence Harrison, *The Central Liberal Truth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006; S. Huntington, *The*

West Unique, Not Universal *Foreign Affairs* Vol 75 No 6 Nov/Dec 1996; and R.J. House, P.J. Hanges, M. Javidan, P. W. Dorfman, & V. Gupta (eds.), *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 2004; and the review of *Culture, Leadership, and Organization* by Thom Wolf, "Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies" *Journal of Applied Christian Leadership* Volume 1 Number 1 Spring 2006, 60-61.